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 Bearing in mind recent analyses of the relationship between race and liber-
alism in Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting Narrative (1789), it is perhaps wise to 
read this pioneering black autobiography with caution.1 Consider, for example, 
a striking passage which appears toward the end of the book. Appealing to his 
English readers to help end slavery, Equiano depicts free trade as an engine of 
mutual benefit, when he argues, “A commercial intercourse with Africa opens 
an inexhaustible source of wealth to the manufacturing interests of Great Brit-
ain.”
Population, the bowels and surface of Africa, abound in valu-
able and useful returns; the hidden treasures of centuries will be 
brought to light and into circulation. Industry, enterprize (sic), 
and mining, will have their full scope, proprtionably (sic) as 
they civilize. . . . I hope the slave-trade will be abolished, I pray 
it may be an event at hand. The great body of manufacturers, 
uniting in the cause, will considerably facilitate and expedite 
it; and, as I have already stated, it is most substantially their 
interest and advantage.2
Thus Equiano invokes some of the most enlightened sentiments of the day. For 
the “instruments of torture used in the slave trade” (234) he would substitute the 
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pressing claims of self-interest, as well as the beguiling incentives of the open 
market. But the taint of economic exploitation that marks slavery is not eliminated 
here, for the apparent equitability of this proposal masks a troubling imbalance. 
Africans can seemingly gain autonomy only by entering into the mercantile sys-
tem that formerly commodified them. And it is this new element of compulsion 
and compromise, which was often invisible to eighteenth-century advocates of 
market capitalism, that has so disturbed modern readers. Even if, as Geraldine 
Murphy suggests, Equiano’s appeal can be read as progressive when situated in 
an era long before the widespread colonization of Africa, the passage remains 
curiously ambiguous, as though the labor which blacks carry out for the white 
man has simply been relocated to their homeland.3 Does Equiano’s invocation 
of laissez faire economics represent a radical route to black emancipation? Or 
does it represent an unwitting acceptance of the oppressive structures that haunt 
Western liberalism?
 For many contemporary critics, the answer to each of these questions would 
be yes. Joseph Fichtelberg, for example, sees the liberal world-view that ema-
nated from the late eighteenth century as “both revolutionary and punitive”—a 
“welter of contradictions” that made it “all but impossible to avert one set of 
constraints without inviting others.”4 The dialectical nature of liberal modernity 
leaves black freemen in limbo, he argues, because it prevents them from gaining 
freedom outside of inherently racist conventions.
By adopting bourgeois discourse Equiano was forced to 
restructure, indeed distort, his own image of Africa, and 
therefore, of himself. Although he attempts to write a story of 
freedom, what emerges is a sense of entrapment, a failure to 
break discursive bonds. But perhaps “adopt” is too strong a 
word. In effect, Equiano was created by that discourse, con-
stituted in the act of writing. (Fichtelberg, 467)
Fichtelberg turns to Fredric Jameson’s concept of the “ideologeme” in order 
“to expose the complex relations between what imagination desires and what 
history allows” (Fichtelberg, 462). Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds makes a similar 
point about the oppressive potential of the liberal tradition, which focuses more 
specifically on the entanglement of slaves in a “legalistic psychology through 
which the individual becomes an actor in public spectacles of exchange relations, 
and consequently exchanges individual subjectivity for a perceived market object 
status designed to ensure success.”5 Building on Fichtelberg’s insights, she un-
derstands this “liberty / law matrix of discourse” (Hinds, 642) to be at the heart 
of the “personally invested awareness of contradiction” (637) experienced by 
emancipated slaves. For while they do hold out the promise of enfranchisement, 
abstract ideals like free labor and the inviolability of contract are also predicated 
upon tacit forms of racial exclusion.
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While an Equiano could . . . engage in the marketplace psy-
chology of universal equivalence, freedom from his legal body 
was simply not an option, even after manumission. . . . The 
law stood as a rather monolithic body of representations—le-
gal “fictions” designed not only to protect Whites, but also 
specifically to withhold protection of Blacks from all nations. 
Equiano could not, nor can we, synthesize these contradictions 
under the sign of the law. (640)
 Significantly, such critiques of Western liberalism have greatly advanced 
our understanding of the challenges which African Americans faced during the 
eighteenth century (and beyond). I have no quarrel with the basic argument 
of critics like Fichtelberg and Hinds. But in focusing so relentlessly on the 
paradoxical nature of liberal values, these analyses obscure the wider political 
complexities of the Revolutionary period. Accepting the ostensible hegemony of 
liberal institutions, both Fichtelberg and Hinds see black subjection and resist-
ance as inseparably linked to mercantile values. What I want to explore in this 
essay, however, is the existence of an alternative political tradition at the birth 
of modernity—one that offered African Americans a very different (if equally 
problematic) means of comprehending their relationship with white society. My 
account of the Interesting Narrative will thus involve resituating the insights of 
Fichtelberg and Hinds within a broader field of contextual analysis and histo-
riographical debate.
 Before engaging the political milieu of the Interesting Narrative, it is impor-
tant to say a few words about its geographical background. Alert readers may have 
already noticed a potential disjunction between Equiano’s address to an English 
audience and my positioning of him within an African-American cultural context. 
Born in Africa and enslaved in the British colonies of North America and the 
Caribbean before settling in London (where the Narrative was first published), 
Equiano was nothing if not cosmopolitan. Indeed, he is an exemplar of what Paul 
Gilroy has famously called “the Black Atlantic,” defined as that diasporic space 
for the circulation of ideas and artifacts that transcends “both the structures of 
the nation state and the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity.”6 That 
Gilroy’s productive terminology does not appear more often in this essay should 
not be taken as a sign that I disagree with his reading of Equiano’s autobiography. 
As will become clear, I do not ignore the global aspects of the Interesting Narra-
tive or the wider slave experience. Instead, by situating Equiano in an African-
American context I want to highlight one particular strand of his story and at the 
same time complicate the emergence of “African-American” identity. As Akiyo 
Ito has pointed out, “while in Britain the Narrative was used politically to end the 
slave trade and played a crucial role in the nationwide abolitionist movement of 
late eighteenth-century England, in America it fit into post-revolutionary rhetoric 
. . . concerned with issues of independence and republicanism.”7 And it is these 
latter issues that are central here. The ideological tension between liberalism and 
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republicanism that is the subject of this essay was also apparent in England, as 
Isaac Kramnick has noted, but nowhere did it appear so starkly or pervasively 
as in the United States.8 Thus framing the Interesting Narrative in a New World 
context will help to draw out these complex tensions in the text, as well as help 
to suggest how and why a self-confessed admirer of “Old England” (Equiano, 
138) became the patriarch of African-American literature.
 Importantly, during the early years of the Cold War, historians like Richard 
Hofstadter, Daniel Boorstin, and Louis Hartz were content to see in the Con-
stitution the consummation of a peculiarly American strain of liberalism.9 The 
United States, these historians insisted, is and always has been a liberal nation. 
Yet at the same time a Lockean emphasis on private property and natural rights 
has been so deeply ingrained in American civilization that it manifests itself as 
conspicuous reality rather than conscious ideology. “The character of our Revo-
lution has nourished our assumption that whatever institutions we happened to 
have here . . . had the self-evident validity of anything that is ‘normal,’” Boorstin 
writes. “We have thus casually established the tradition that it is superfluous to 
the American condition to produce elaborate treatises on political philosophy or 
to be explicit about political values and the theory of community.”10 According 
to this interpretation, any non-heteronomous critique of the principles enshrined 
in the Constitution was almost impossible. Precisely mirroring the social and 
cultural circumstances of the Revolutionary generation, the liberal ideal exerted 
a hegemonic command over them that precluded other modes of political dis-
crimination. As Hartz has wryly observed: “Locke dominates American political 
thought, as no thinker anywhere dominates the political thought of a nation.”11 
If we take this exegesis at face value we are thus left with a tantalizingly com-
prehensive and coherent model of Revolutionary ideology. Yet we need only 
recall the objections which the Anti-Federalists raised to the ratification of the 
Constitution to realize that such an analysis radically oversimplifies American 
political thinking in the late eighteenth century.12 
 Nonetheless, by posing liberalism as a singular, unifying source for the poli-
tics of the Revolutionary era, consensus historiography has continued to structure 
analysis of that period within fields as diverse as those of moral philosophy, 
legal history, and literary criticism.13 In the domain of African American studies 
too, the spirit (if not the letter) of Hartz can be detected in Elizabeth Jane Wall 
Hinds’s narrowly-focused concern with the “Enlightenment individualism con-
structed by an expanding capitalist marketplace in the last half of the eighteenth 
century” (635). Yet, the persistence of this law-based and property-driven model 
of American political thought should not be mistaken for its accuracy. In an es-
say first published in 1988, Isaac Kramnick persuasively argued that far from 
being historically and conceptually hegemonic, liberalism during the emergence 
of democratic modernity, was actively engaged in a struggle with the legacy of 
classical republicanism. “There was a profusion and confusion of political tongues 
among the founders,” he argues. “They lived easily with that clatter; it is we 
two hundred years later who chafe at their inconsistency. Reading the framers 
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and critics of the Constitution, one discerns the languages of republicanism and 
of Lockean liberalism, . . . of state-centered theories of power and sovereignty,
. . . and the ‘moral sentiment’ schools of the Scottish Enlightenment.”14 
 Characterized by thinkers ranging from Hobbes and Locke to Smith and 
Mill, liberalism tends to segregate society into public and private spaces, while 
allowing law-making citizens to become law-abiding subjects. Thinkers from 
Aristotle and Machiavelli to Harrington and Montesquieu have characterized 
republicanism as tending to view society as made whole through public partici-
pation in the political process, while regarding the liberal reduction of citizen to 
subject as a corruption of civic virtue. It is this latter distinction which is central 
to the shifts in American historiography begun by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon S. 
Wood, and J. G. A. Pocock some thirty years ago. Breaking with the liberal 
consensus historiography of the 1950s, Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock all sought to 
reconstruct the ideological context of the Revolution in terms that took account 
of the Americans’ explicitly stated political values.15 What they identified was 
a form of republicanism, derived from classical models, which took as one of 
its central tenets the primacy of political participation and public institutions. 
As Wood notes: “This common interest was not, as we might today think of it, 
simply the sum or consensus of the particular interests that made up the com-
munity. It was rather an entity in itself, prior to and distinct from the various 
private interests of groups and individuals.”16 Read in these terms, the American 
struggle for independence thus represents a moment of unparalleled innovation 
in the country’s political history rather than a moment of axiomatic consolida-
tion. Indeed, although it may have ultimately failed to shape the new form of 
government established in the late 1780s, republicanism can be seen as the source 
of an ongoing challenge to the import of liberal principles. “I am not calling in 
question the historical reality of ‘liberalism’ or ‘possessive individualism,’ so 
much as those ‘liberal’ . . . interpretations of history, in which everything leads 
up to and away from a monolithic domination of ‘liberal’ ideas somewhere in 
the nineteenth century,” Pocock writes. “What went on in the eighteenth century 
was not a unidirectional transformation of thought in favour of the acceptance 
of ‘liberal’ or ‘market’ man, but a bitter, conscious, and ambivalent dialogue.”17 
The significance of the republican synthesis, in other words, lies in its attack on 
both the ideological and the institutional presuppositions of a Lockean consen-
sus. For not only does it instigate a continuing debate over the meaning of the 
Revolution, it also opens that debate onto questions about the infrastructure of 
democratic citizenship.
 Tracking back from these critical interventions to the rhetoric and ideals 
of the Revolutionary era itself, the civic humanist tradition certainly seems to 
have functioned as a site of resistance to the influence of early modern capital-
ism, as I will presently try to show. But I am not going to attempt to represent 
republicanism as counter-hegemonic, because outside of the analytic mind-set 
of a certain group of mid-twentieth-century scholars, liberalism was never 
hegemonic in the first place. Instead, the two ideologies can perhaps be more 
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accurately described as reciprocally determining drives situated within a much 
larger conceptual framework of Enlightenment libertarianism. Some historians 
more contemporary than Hartz and company would inevitably balk at the very 
notion of posing liberalism and republicanism as two competing eighteenth-
century philosophies. On the other hand, commentators like Daniel T. Rodgers 
have suggested that such a dialectic has passed its intellectual sell-by date.18 In 
their view, the word “republicanism” has become so overburdened with meaning 
and significance that it can no longer usefully perform the task of describing a 
particular body of American thought. 
 And to a certain extent they might be right. Bernard Bailyn and his adherents 
have, after all, displayed a definite tendency to grant republicanism the all-en-
compassing status which they would deny to liberalism. But the homogenizing 
effect of much of their work should not cause us to rethink the political debates 
of the Revolutionary generation entirely. A new wave of scholars, led by Joyce 
Appleby, has recently begun to breathe fresh life into discussion of the period 
by stressing that “the appeal of different constructions of reality . . . in an intel-
lectually pluralistic society” meant that eighteenth-century political culture was 
more “a patchwork of thought” than a tidy unity of belief.19 Seeking to deal out 
the intellectual honors more fairly and trace more precisely the process of ideo-
logical interaction, these proponents of what might be called a liberal–republican 
synthesis offer a more thorough and convincing account of how the eighteenth-
century minds worked. Take, for instance, the case of Olaudah Equiano. In my 
opening paragraph, I located him within the liberal tradition because his insist-
ence that “the manufacturing interest and the general interest are synonimous 
(sic)” (Equiano, 234) so closely echoes the precepts of someone like Adam 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776). Later on, however, I locate him within 
the republican tradition because he invokes Milton as part of his defense of the 
slave’s capacity for virtue. What this example then suggests is that laissez-faire 
capitalism and civic humanism are neither hopelessly confused categories, nor 
mutually exclusive. Rather, it suggests that liberalism and republicanism name 
two contesting and inseparable possibilities inscribed within a single value system 
(and often within the same text).
 To the semantic queries of a critic like Rodgers we can thus respond with 
Peter S. Onuf’s argument that “the emerging picture of discursive pluralism
. . . promises to reinstate agency and purposeful action in our accounts of the 
founding.”20 Moreover, we might also argue that the field of African American 
studies, unlike that of labor or women’s history, has not been fully integrated 
into the republican paradigm and so is still ripe for analysis.21 Perhaps an even 
more powerful criticism of recent scholarship than that of conceptual bagginess 
and congestion, however, relies precisely on that republicanism is a paradigm. 
Distrusting the ideological approach to the Revolution adopted by Bernard Bailyn 
and his heirs, historians such as John P. Diggins have argued that the distinction 
between liberalism and republicanism is simply a reflection of late-twentieth-cen-
tury academic politics with little relevance to the truth of the period.22 And again 
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there is some substance to this criticism. The labels of “liberal” and “republican” 
did indeed first emerge as categories of historiographical inquiry. But this does 
not mean that they cannot offer us insights into the eighteenth century. 
 Nonetheless such labels are useful tools for analysis (not to mention widely 
accepted), and to abandon them wholesale is to risk plunging blindly into the 
past. By refusing to connect individual actions to wider forces, for instance, Dig-
gins himself falls into the trap of presenting history as a procession of isolated 
lives and often ends up simply replicating the (necessarily) narrow purview of 
the thinkers he studies. What is more, his interpretive stance also returns us to 
the bad old days of assuming that liberalism is axiomatic and all-explanatory. 
As Steven Watts has asked of Diggins: 
Must we jettison psychology, statistical analysis, and sociology 
because Adams and Jefferson never read Erik Erikson, saw 
a computer or encountered Max Weber? [No], it is precisely 
modern “conceptual knowledge” that often allows us to climb 
inside the mentality of Americans of another age. . . . Subtle 
but critical distinctions between republican “independence” 
and liberal “self-interest,” for example, elude the historian 
determined to establish a Lockean tradition for Revolutionary 
America.23
The fact that we should treat our contextual paradigms with caution and refine-
ment does not negate their descriptive and analytical potential. My own approach, 
in this regard, intentionally makes use of relatively abstract and theoretical ac-
counts of Revolutionary discourse in order to produce a new reading of African-
American political thought. But it also seeks to reconnect these accounts to the 
historical reality from which they have emerged by attending to the specificity 
and interrelation of eighteenth-century keywords like “independence” and “self-
interest” or “virtue” and “commerce.”24 
 Before pursuing this line of inquiry, however, I should perhaps add “litera-
ture” to that list of historical keywords I have just delineated. For this term is 
not just central to my argument, it is also, as a number of recent studies have 
pointed out, central to the political life of eighteenth-century America. Though 
their conclusions differ, Michael Warner, David Shields, and Christopher Grasso 
amongst others, have all argued that an attention to the dynamics of republicanism 
ought to lead to a re-evaluation of the role that literature played in the Revolu-
tion.25 In The Letters of the Republic (1990), for example, Warner argues that the 
printing press is not simply a neutral mechanism that acts as an undifferentiated 
tool for self-expression. Instead, print and culture have a reciprocally influential 
relationship, and the uses and values attached to print change over time. In an 
echo of the privileges granted by liberal democracy to the individual, modern 
literary critics are conventionally inclined to focus on writing as an expression 
of the author’s inner self. But since the Founding Fathers also espoused a form 
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of classical republicanism that took civic prosperity as its central concern, they 
were equally likely to regard writing as a tool for political analysis. As Warner 
notes,
Developed in practices of literacy that included the produc-
tion and consumption of newspapers, broadsides, pamphlets, 
legal documents, and books, the republican ideology of print 
elevated the values of generality over those of the personal. 
In this cognitive vocabulary the social diffusion of printed 
artifacts took on the investment of the disinterested virtue of 
the public orientation, as opposed to the corrupting interests 
and passions of particular and local persons.26
 Accordingly then, the modern understanding of “literature” as an aesthetic 
category primarily referring to works of the imagination is often misplaced when 
applied to the late eighteenth century. For not only did the Revolutionary genera-
tion use the term to describe almost all forms of writing, but also their concern 
with utility led them to assign imaginative works to a subordinate position within 
this category. What is more, the Revolutionary insistence that “the word Litera-
ture ought to be taken in its most comprehensive sense” often went beyond mere 
generic inclusivity to encompass all other sites of political discourse.27 Public 
institutions, such as literary salons and coffee houses, where disparate social 
groups could ostensibly meet to discuss issues of general importance were, after 
all, central to the republican self-image. Theoretically free from domination by 
any single group or interest, these communal spaces symbolized a more egalitarian 
alternative to the perceived absolutism of the British monarchical state.28 Thus 
American writers, keen to align themselves with the ideals of civic humanism, 
frequently turned to this newly minted version of social relations as a model. The 
Philadelphia Monthly Magazine, for example, was not alone when it it claimed, 
in a 1798 essay “On the Advantages of Periodical Performances,” that: “Men 
of all ranks, and of all nations, however widely disjoined from each other, may 
be said to be brought together here to converse at their ease, without ceremony 
or restraint, as at a masquerade, where, if propriety of dress and expression be 
observed, nothing else is required.”29 
 There were, of course, limitations upon this model of literature. On one hand, 
the growing popularity of novels and the growing pressure for copyright in the 
late eighteenth century signals the proliferation of an alternative mode of under-
standing print. Buoyed up by the maturation of liberalism’s egoist philosophy, a 
more individualistic, market-oriented attitude to writing was on the ascendance.30 
On the other hand, the Philadelphia Monthly’s reference to “propriety of dress 
and expression” suggests the internal constraints to the civic humanist mode of 
understanding literature. For although the republic of letters was supposed to be 
open to anyone regardless of background, in reality the implicit qualifications 
for entry led to many exclusions. As Michael Warner himself notes: “Because 
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the same differentials of gender, race, and class allocated both citizenship . . . 
and active literacy, . . . freehold and discourse could coincide without necessar-
ily entailing an extension of power.”31 Each of these conceptual obstacles are, in 
fact, acknowledged in the following analysis of eighteenth-century black writing. 
They are, however, only a part of my argument. In the first case, I am interested in 
recovering some neglected aspects of African-American print culture, and in the 
second, I am concerned with how the egalitarian potential of political speech was 
realized by unschooled slaves. Precisely because the liberal model of literature 
eventually became dominant in the mid-nineteenth century, its stranglehold on 
contemporary scholars often prevents them from appreciating the wider political 
nuances of eighteenth-century writing. Thus, rather than building on otherwise 
perceptive accounts of how Olaudah Equiano employed literary property laws or 
sentimental confessionalism, I want to consider how his concrete representations 
of authorship connect him to the republican tradition.32 And similarly, in relation 
to the question of the boundaries of the public sphere, I am also preoccupied with 
the heft and complex detail of the Interesting Narrative. In analyzing the contours 
of Revolutionary thought, contemporary scholars have well documented how this 
discourse involved the marginalization and exclusion of non-white people.33 But 
some African Americans, like Equiano, did manage to make themselves heard. 
Without dismissing the constraints they faced, it is the substance of their speech 
that intrigues me.
 In particular, this essay seeks to comprehend how the early American 
slave narrative utilized two specific strands of republican ideology. The first of 
these strands evolves directly out of what we might call the base of the latter. 
Following the explosive growth of printing outlets during the mid-eighteenth 
century, the seemingly expansive and unrestrained nature of literary production 
in America allowed republican thinkers to conceive it as a means of collective 
inclusion. Neatly coinciding with the more egalitarian tendencies of the civic 
humanist tradition, the spread of knowledge thus became a key to the political 
well-being of the nation.34 “Without learning, men become savages or barbar-
ians, and where learning is confined to a few people, we always find monarchy, 
aristocracy, and slavery,” insisted the noted educationalist Benjamin Rush in 
1786. “Let our pupil be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is 
public property.”35 There is, of course, an apparent contradiction in this argument 
between intellectual independence and political submissiveness. By asserting that 
the individual does not have rights of ownership over himself, Rush would seem 
to be reproducing the social conditions of slavery. But with his careful charting 
of a course between the passive obeisance of feudalism and the uncontrolled 
self-possession of liberalism, Rush, in this example, is actually writing from an 
ideological perspective wherein the greatest freedom lies in sacrificing oneself 
to the public good. Indeed, it is out of this paradoxical equation that emerges 
the second strand of republican thought that interests me. This strand, which we 
might call the ethical superstructure, deals with the subsequent exercise of this 
sense of civic responsibility. The uncensored content and wide circulation of print, 
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in this regard, is not only a means for political inclusion, it is also a source for 
political participation. Precisely because it allowed people to access individuals 
and issues well beyond their own personal domain, literature was regarded as an 
ideal conduit for the practice of disinterested virtue. In fact, for many republican 
thinkers, it was nothing less than a moral imperative for the ordinary citizen to 
expose corruption and subject the behavior of others to public scrutiny.36
 Bearing such arguments in mind, we can then perhaps begin to re-contextual-
ize the issue of African-American political thought through reference to the role 
that literacy plays in eighteenth-century black culture. Seeking to establish their 
authenticity and significance, early black autobiographers frequently emphasized 
within the text the authors’ ability to write.37 Examples include A Narrative 
of the Most Remarkable Particulars in the Life of James Gronniosaw (1772) 
and A Narrative of the Lord’s Wonderful Dealings with John Marrant (1785). 
However, probably the most famous encounter between an African American 
and literature in the eighteenth century occurs in Olaudah Equiano’s Interest-
ing Narrative. Often cited as a major paradigm for the nineteenth-century slave 
narrative, Equiano’s text incisively reflects the cultural alienation experienced 
by those Africans who were forcibly transplanted to the New World. Kidnapped 
from his homeland as a child, Equiano is put to work on a plantation in Virginia 
before being purchased by an English naval officer. Embarking as this man’s 
servant on the first of many sea voyages, it is at this point that Equiano becomes 
aware of the printed word. As he describes it:
I had often seen my master and Dick employed in reading; and 
I had a great curiosity to talk to the books, as I thought they did; 
and . . . for that purpose I have often taken up a book, and have 
talked to it, and then put my ears to it, when alone, in hopes 
it would answer me; and I have been very much concerned 
when I found it remained silent. (Equiano, 68)
Crucially, this scene places Equiano both inside and outside the privileged circle 
of white readers. Positioned in the past tense, Equiano is a slave who has been 
excluded from Western culture and is unable to understand the communicative 
technology of literature. Positioned in the present tense, however, he is a free 
man who has assimilated proscribed knowledge and is able to recollect his 
perceptions in the pages of an autobiography. Bridging the gap between these 
two positions, the bulk of Equiano’s Narrative can then be read as a chronicle 
of the author’s progress from brutal objectification to literate objectivity. Both 
as a point of constraint and a point of departure the talking book episode seems 
to capture something central to the black experience of literature during the 
Enlightenment.
 Indeed, as Henry Louis Gates has pointed out, the figure of the talking book 
is a recurring motif in eighteenth-century black writing.38 Because of their sus-
tained elimination from the institutions of the public sphere, African Americans 
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have always viewed print as a means of civic participation and social critique, 
Gates argues: 
The texts of the slave could only be read as testimony of defile-
ment: the slave’s representation and reversal of the master’s 
attempt to transform a human being into a commodity, and 
the slave’s simultaneous verbal witness of the possession of a 
humanity shared in common with Europeans.39
In this respect then, Gates’s analysis is important because it helps us to under-
stand more clearly how questions of material form impact upon questions of 
autobiographical content in African-American writing. For all the promise of 
these insights, however, the critical response to them has been strangely cursory. 
One reason for this neglect, it should be said, lies in Gates’s obscuring historical 
detail through the undifferentiated theorization of black resistance under the rubric 
of “signifying.” A more potent reason, though, might be found in the neo-Marx-
ist focus of much recent African-American scholarship. Houston A. Baker, for 
example, has exerted a powerful influence over studies of early black writing 
through his acute analysis of the relationship between liberal ideology and the 
slave narrative. “All Afro-American creativity is conditioned by (and constitutes 
a component of) a historical discourse that privileges certain economic terms,” 
he writes in Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature (1984). “The crea-
tive individual (the black subject) must, therefore, whether he self-consciously 
wills it or not, come to terms with ‘commercial deportation’ and the ‘economics 
of slavery.’”40 Thus while Gates reads Equiano’s life story as an example of 
critical self-assertion, Baker reads it as an example of the serious constraints 
faced by human property when attempting to utilize the natural rights tradition. 
And it is this approach to the Interesting Narrative which subsequent critics 
like Joseph Fichtelberg and Elizabeth Hinds have developed and refined.41 “The 
impasse can be simply stated: in the Narrative, an enslaving commodity rela-
tion in which the self is an isolated thing is made to yield [to] a ‘self-mastery’ 
in which an isolated self is defined through things” (Fichtelbert, 467). But in his 
struggle for liberty, one might ask, is Equiano really always unable to transcend 
the paradoxes of liberalism, or is he also capable of gaining a critical distance 
from liberal ideologies?
 Importantly, to ask this question is to highlight the disjunctive relationship 
between subjection and resistance in African American scholarship. To answer it 
will involve considering eighteenth-century black writing in the light of a more 
complex historical model. In this respect, one particular episode in the Interesting 
Narrative begins to suggest a more systematic approach to its constraints. After 
gaining his manumission and embarking upon a series of adventures spanning the 
globe, Equiano eventually returns to work for one of his former masters, Charles 
Irving. Briefly describing his time on Irving’s sugar plantation in the Caribbean, 
Equiano makes it clear that his motives for taking a job with a white man were 
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primarily financial. “I accepted of the offer, knowing that the harvest was fully 
ripe in those parts” (Equiano, 202). What also becomes apparent, however, is 
that Equiano was hired to supervise Irving’s slaves. Thus this episode seems 
to illustrate almost literally the idea that liberal modes of autonomy are predi-
cated upon forms of racial exploitation. A tenacious and skillful entrepreneur, 
throughout the Narrative Equiano persistently attempts to accumulate property 
in order to secure his freedom. And in doing so he becomes entangled in the 
self-deceiving mechanisms of the marketplace. But to halt our interpretation of 
the Interesting Narrative here is to ignore the ideological alternatives that play 
beneath the surface of Equiano’s self-presentation. Within the Irving episode, 
for example, Equiano actually devotes more space to describing his experiences 
with the native population than he does to discussing his economic activities. 
Skipping over the practical purpose of his visit to the Caribbean, the ex-slave 
emphasizes in particular an encounter with several kidnapped Indians, one of 
whom he befriends and tries to educate. As he puts it,
In our passage I took all the pains that I could to instruct the 
Indian prince . . . and to my great joy, he was quite attentive. 
. . . I taught him in the compass of eleven days all the letters, 
and he could even put two or three of them together, and spell 
them. I had Fox’s Martyrology with cuts, and he used to be 
very fond of looking into it. (203)
Significantly then, this scene suggests the political value that African Americans 
attached to print. Positing literacy as a powerful tool in overcoming the 
vagaries of racial subjugation, Equiano echoes his own prior experience. For 
he has earned his independence not just by exploiting the economic vestiges 
of enslavement for his own ends but also through the combative force of 
his intellect. Consequently, Equiano’s position in the Irving episode is more 
equivocal than it initially appears—it simply does not conform to the absolute 
absorption in bourgeois false consciousness as Fichtelberg implies.
 Instead, Equiano’s Interesting Narrative embodies an important ideological 
contest which was occurring within the late-eighteenth-century public sphere. 
By using the shorthand of the political theory which I have set out above, we 
can see Equiano’s oscillation between trade and literature as alternative modes 
of self-liberation that mirror historical tensions between liberalism and repub-
licanism. Within republicanism, for example, access to the public sphere was 
predicated upon literary institutions because they enabled a notion of citizenship 
grounded in critical argument. Thus in 1773, Benjamin Rush proposed that in 
order to prepare African Americans for freedom they should be given the tools 
to participate in the legislative life of the community. “Let the young negroes 
be educated in the principles of virtue,” he insisted. “Let them be taught to read, 
and write . . . to entitle them to all the privileges of free-born citizens.”42 Seen 
from this perspective, slavery is objectionable because it undermines a sense of 
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civic responsibility and prevents the exercise of human reason. Within liberalism, 
however, access to the public sphere is predicated upon property because that 
instrument enables a notion of citizenship grounded in autonomous exchange. 
Consequently, antislavery writers also argued that oppressed blacks could be 
emancipated through their integration into the realm of commerce. Anthony 
Benezet, for example, suggested in 1771 that “where the nature of the country 
would permit, as certainly the uncultivated condition of our southern and most 
western colonies easily would, suppose a small tract of land were assigned to 
each Negro family, and they obliged to live upon and improve it. . . . This would 
encourage them to exert their abilities and become industrious subjects.”43 In 
this context then, the nascent ideal of a society regulated through personal enter-
prise led to condemnation of slavery for the negative effect it had on mercantile 
progress and private endeavour. And indeed, it was this latter philosophy that 
became increasingly dominant at the end of the eighteenth century.44
 Faced with the encroaching influence of liberal principles, Equiano himself 
frequently turns to the interpretive model of commerce both in order to assimilate 
his life story to Western norms and in order to critique black subjugation from 
a Western perspective. In the opening chapter of the Interesting Narrative, for 
example, he gives an account of his childhood which deliberately refashions the 
popular image of Africa so that it accords with bourgeois values. Systematizing 
the evidence from travel narratives and trade reports, social historians like Adam 
Ferguson and John Millar repeatedly argued that Africa’s environmental fertility 
prevented it from moving beyond elementary modes of subsistence.45 Equiano, 
on the other hand, maintains that although Benin is materially abundant, its 
inhabitants nonetheless have established a coherent and burgeoning exchange 
economy. 
As we live in a country where nature is prodigal of her favours, 
our wants are few and easily supplied; of course we have few 
manufactures. . . . But these make no part of our commerce, the 
principal articles of which . . . are provisions. In such a state 
money is of little use; however we have some small pieces of 
coin. . . . We have also markets, at which I have been frequently 
with my mother. (Equiano, 36)
 Consistently elaborating connections between Igbo customs and white 
civilization, Equiano’s depiction of his birthplace is shrewdly designed to sug-
gest that the incorporation of Africans into American society would involve a 
consolidation rather than an abandonment of its underlying edicts. Repudiating 
the racist stereotype of blacks as lazy and thievish, Equiano instead emphasizes 
the diligence and thrift of his fellow countrymen. “Agriculture is our chief em-
ployment; and every one, even the children and women, are engaged in it,” he 
asserts. “Thus we are all habituated to labour from our earliest years. Every one 
contributes something to the common stock; and as we are unacquainted with 
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idleness, we have no beggars” (37). Self-reliant and socially harmonious, the 
Africa of the Interesting Narrative is little short of being a liberal utopia.46
 Consequently, Equiano’s abduction and enslavement represents an even more 
perverse abuse of human autonomy. For while he was once capable of active 
participation in the marketplace, he now finds that he himself is a commodity. 
Shipped from the west coast of Africa to the West Indies and North America, 
Equiano is eventually brought to England, where he receives a blunt lesson in 
the economics of racial subjugation. Naively protesting to his owner that he has 
not been paid for his hard work, the neophyte slave is summarily stripped of his 
possessions. As Equiano recalls:
The only coat I had with me my master took away with him, 
and said, “If your [wages] had been £10,000 I had a right to it 
all, and would have taken it.” I had about nine guineas, which 
during my long sea-faring life, I had scraped together from 
trifling perquisites and little ventures; and I hid it that instant, 
lest my master should take that from me likewise. (94)
Robbed of the results of his private enterprise here, Equiano is also constantly 
subject to the arbitrary dissimulations of the white men he tries to do business 
with. Indeed, in ironic contrast to the economic egalitarianism of Igbo society, 
the West can be seen as betraying its own liberal principles precisely because it 
allows blacks to be deprived of the fruits of their labor. Drawing on the rhetoric of 
laissez-faire, Equiano insistently argues that the exclusion of African Americans 
from trade damages and artificially constrains market relations. As he puts it: 
“No greater regard [is] shown to the little property than there is to the persons 
and lives of the negroes. . . . Surely this traffic cannot be good, which . . . gives 
one man a dominion over his fellows. . . . Are slaves more useful by . . . being 
humbled to the condition of brutes, than they would be if suffered to enjoy the 
privileges of free men?” (108).
 Confronted with the oppressive restrictions placed upon black commerce, 
slaves had to resort to rather unconventional means of involvement in the culture 
of possessive individualism. Indeed, before they could even begin to think 
about entering the marketplace they had to assert their right to one particularly 
special piece of property—themselves.47 Accordingly, one of the key moments 
in the Interesting Narrative occurs when Equiano symbolically reclaims the use 
value of his own body. Accosted by a pair of potential kidnappers in Georgia, 
he refuses to let them treat him as a commodity. “I told them to be still and keep 
off,” he recollects. “At this they paused a little, and one said to the other—it 
will not do; and the other answered that I talked too good English. I replied, I 
believed I did; and I had also with me a revengeful stick equal to the occasion” 
(159). Having discovered a newly liberated sense of self, Equiano is then able 
to take advantage of the slender opportunities for acquisition available to slaves. 
Sold to a Pennsylvanian merchant named Robert King, he exploits the relative 
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freedom of working on trading vessels in the Caribbean in order to make money 
himself. “I laid . . . out in various things occasionally, and it used to turn out 
to very good account, especially when we went to Guadaloupe, Grenada, 
and the rest of the French islands,” he notes. “In process of time I became 
master of a few pounds, and in fair way of making more” (116). As Equiano’s 
deliberate use of that psychologically loaded word “master” in this latter line 
suggests, commerce effectively allows him to overcome the strictures of white 
domination. Indeed, by cunningly capitalizing on his circumstances Equiano 
is eventually able to pay for the manumission offered by his sympathetic new 
owner.
 For all its ostensibly progressive inclinations, however, liberalism also 
posed certain problems for its early spokesmen when it came to the issue of 
racial oppression. In this respect, precisely because it equated freedom with 
the possession of goods, liberalism ironically often served to protect the rights 
of those who treated blacks as chattel. As Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out, 
“The absence of any clear disjunction between what are now called ‘human’ 
and ‘property’ rights formed a massive roadblock across the route to abolition 
of slavery.”48 Having pursued a revolution in the name of economic liberty, 
political theorists of Lockean extraction could not logically violate this ideal by 
endorsing compulsory manumission. Thus in “The Federalist No. 54” (1788), 
James Madison had grudgingly compromised with the Southern states by writ-
ing slaves into early American political culture as an amalgam of personhood 
and property.49 Similarly, in the congressional debate which took place over 
Absalom Jones’s “Petition of the People of Colour” (1799), representatives like 
Silas Lee of Massachusetts and Harrison Otis of Connecticut found themselves 
unable to intervene on behalf of those blacks who were demanding the release 
of their brethren. “Gentlemen are sent to this House to protect the rights of the 
people and the rights of property,” Lee notes. “That property which the people 
of the Southern States possess consists of slaves, and therefore Congress has 
no authority but to protect it, and not take measures to deprive the citizens of 
it.”50 Despite their stated objections to the mistreatment of African Americans, 
the Northern delegates aligned themselves with their Southern colleagues in 
questioning the political viability of Jones’s demands. As Lee himself puts it: “I 
hold myself not second to any gentleman in a genuine attachment to the rights 
of humanity, but cannot believe that great ends would be answered by reference 
of the petition, [although] much evil might accrue.”51
 The Lockean construction of liberty, morever, also presented specific 
challenges for enterprising slaves like Olaudah Equiano and his contemporary 
Venture Smith. Largely eschewing an emphasis on black literacy, Smith’s Nar-
rative of a Native of Africa (1798) instead tenders its protagonist as the very 
epitome of liberal values. “The reader may here see a Franklin . . . in a state of 
nature, or rather in a state of slavery,” the preface to the book declares. “This 
narrative exhibits a pattern of honesty, prudence and industry, to people of his 
own colour; and perhaps some white people who would not find themselves 
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degraded by imitating such an example.”52 Bearing out this synopsis, Smith’s 
Narrative then traces an idealized model of black citizenship in which the way 
to wealth also offers slaves a clearly defined route to emancipation. Forced into 
servitude on farms in Connecticut and Rhode Island, Smith is continually mak-
ing wise investments and carrying out expedient transactions until he gathers 
the means to purchase his freedom. But in seeking to attain subjectivity through 
the ideological structures of the marketplace, Smith can also be seen to be un-
consciously perpetuating those economic presumptions that underpinned racial 
oppression. Committed to viewing the world through the cognitive lens of trade, 
he ends up reducing even his most intimate relationships to their exchange value. 
“Solomon my eldest son, being in his seventeenth year . . . I hired him out to one 
Charles Church,” he notes at one point. “[But] my son died of the scurvy . . . and 
Church has never yet paid me the least of his wages. In my son, besides the loss 
of his life, I lost equal to seventy-five pounds” (Smith, 26). Moving beyond the 
intended critique of white duplicity, Smith’s grief seems to stem as much from 
economic imperatives as it does from emotional ones. Compelled to repeatedly 
demonstrate the merits of possessive individualism, the industrious slave thus 
falls prey to that ontological elision between humanity and property which 
dogged eighteenth-century liberalism. As Philip Gould has pointed out: “The 
value that Smith places on the self . . . signals the problem of commodification 
that characterized antislavery writing in general and early black autobiography 
in particular.”53
 Faced with this seemingly intractable dilemma, Gould himself, in Barbaric 
Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World 
(2003), turns to the discourses of sentimentalism in order to try and understand 
how early black writers might have evaded the pitfalls of possessive individual-
ism. “My study of literary antislavery is about what gets lost in the story of the 
triumph of liberalism,” he argues. “Whereas the liberal argument assumes that 
sentiment was merely symptomatic of commercial and industrial capitalism, 
I emphasize the mutually constitutive relation of sentiment and capitalism.”54 
Pointedly extricating an alternative mode of self-valuation from the rubble of 
laissez-faire idealism, Gould thus opens up for us an often neglected strand of 
abolitionist thought.55 We can, in short, begin to see more clearly how the language 
of sentimentality allowed antislavery campaigners to isolate and critique the 
racist effects of free enterprise. Take, for instance, some anonymous “Remarks 
on the Slave Trade” published in The American Museum in 1789. “Where is the 
human being,” the author asks, “that can picture to himself this scene of woe, 
without at the same time execrating a trade which spreads misery and desolation 
wherever it appears? Where is the man of real benevolence, who will not join 
heart and hand, in opposing this . . . iniquitous traffic?”56 Conjoining intuitive 
emotion with an ethical imperative to reject the processes of commodification, 
this essay effectively circumvents the ontological blurring experienced by Ven-
ture Smith. But while Gould is quite right to emphasize the dialectical relation-
ship between sentimentality and capitalism, his assertion that sentimentalism is 
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somehow extrinsic to liberalism is misleading. For as The American Museum’s 
reference to “real benevolence” suggests, the discourse of sentimentalism was 
inextricably bound to the emergence of bourgeois democracy. Indeed, “benevo-
lence” (or “sympathy” to give it another familiar name) was a keyword in the 
political lexicon of men like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.57 Yet Gould 
overlooks this important context for his argument.
 Rapidly assimilated into Revolutionary thought during the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, the particular strand of liberalism that privileged benevolence 
owed much to the Scottish Enlightenment—in particular, to the work of Francis 
Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and Adam Smith.58 Seeking to explain the ground rules 
that defined the rights of individuals and imposed collective obligations in an 
advanced society, these philosophers rejected the Hobbesian thesis that human 
conceptions of “good” and “bad” are rooted in rational calculation rather than 
natural impulses. Instead, they argued, ethical principles proceed from an innate 
desire to be treated with respect. Because we see that certain kinds of actions 
would be intolerable to ourselves, we judge these actions as forms of injustice 
toward others, and thus, appropriately condemned and forbidden. As Smith sug-
gests in his hugely influential Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759):
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the for-
tune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of see-
ing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which 
we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are 
made to conceive . . . what we ourselves should feel in the 
like situation.59
 Clearly the antislavery essay in The American Museum, with its compelling 
injunction that the reader “picture to himself [a] scene of woe,” fits into this 
paradigm of liberal equivalence. But the invocation of the work of Adam Smith 
also raises the spectre of a troubling obstacle to the coherence of liberalism itself. 
For how can we reconcile the benevolent selflessness described in the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments with the categorical self-interest affirmed in The Wealth 
of Nations? How, to put it another way, can we understand sentimentality and 
capitalism as mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive?
 The answer, at least in part, has been identified by recent analysts of the 
so-called “Adam Smith problem.”60 Moving beyond traditional Marxist assump-
tions about the primacy of homo economicus, these scholars have sought to 
acknowledge the complexity of eighteenth-century liberalism by re-historicizing 
key facets of Smith’s philosophy. Thus, as Mark Blaug notes, they have “argued 
that the inconsistency between the altruism that motivates people in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments and the selfishness that motivates them in the Wealth of 
Nations is more apparent than real because the crucial concept of ‘sympathy’ 
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or empathy in the former book is not at all what we mean by altruism, namely, 
caring for others to the point of sacrificing ourselves for them.”61 When seen in 
their proper context sympathy and self-interest are not radically incompatible. 
They are still different, of course, reciprocally so, allowing them to act as checks 
upon each other. In the first case, for example, the lack of concern that others 
may have for our private sorrow serves to temper the potentially disruptive nature 
of sentimentalism. Excessive sympathy, according to Smith, encourages men 
to ignore the necessary self-restraints that should regulate encounters among 
individuals in the public arena. So a certain degree of indifference is essential 
to both ourselves and others in order that social equilibrium can be achieved. 
“We expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend,” 
he writes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, “[and] still less sympathy from an 
assembly of strangers, and we assume, therefore, still more tranquility before 
them, and always endeavor to bring our passion down to that pitch, which the 
particular company we are in may be expected to go along with” (Smith, Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, 28). 
 Similarly, in the case of self-interest, its conceptual counterpart also helps 
to act as a monitoring device. By narrowing the analysis of liberalism down to 
economic relations, The Wealth of Nations may seem to advance an unquali-
fied model of self-interest. But in his earlier book, Smith had already defined 
self-interest in terms that made clear its functional limitations. Our tendency to 
ruthlessly pursue gain at the expense of others, he argues there, is moderated by 
an innate sense of moral propriety:
When the happiness or misery of others depends in any respect 
upon our conduct, we dare not, as self-love might suggest to 
us, prefer the interest of one to that of many. . . . [We] are led 
by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of 
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, 
and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the 
interest of the society. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, 215)
In other words, because we can imagine being treated as others are treated and 
because we are dependent upon social harmony for our well-being, it is in our 
self-interest to moderate our pursuits of personal gain in order to treat other 
people with a degree of respect. Stripped of its later semantic accoutrements, 
the behavioral mechanism of sympathy thus mediates the various complications 
that arise from possessive individualism.
 Certainly, Olaudah Equiano’s appropriation of capitalist values helps to ac-
count for many of the philosophical contradictions that haunt his autobiography. 
In the first chapter of the Interesting Narrative, for example, Equiano’s positive 
account of his countrymen’s commerce leads him to blur the lines between per-
sonal endeavour and economic bondage. “All our industry is exerted to improve 
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[the] blessings of nature,” he claims in one passage, before adding that: “The 
benefits of such a mode of living are obvious. The West-India planters prefer 
the slaves of Benin or Eboe to those of any other part of Guinea, for their har-
diness, intelligence, integrity and zeal” (37). Unintentionally compressing the 
semantic space between these last two sentences, Equiano is in effect induced to 
condone black subjugation as evidence of his people’s good character. Moreover, 
this conceptual slippage also extends beyond the level of rhetoric to the deeper 
ideological configurations of the Interesting Narrative. Most notably perhaps, 
towards the end of his book Equiano introduces the argument that by treating 
blacks as equals the West could engage in a mutually profitable trade with the 
Igbo. “A commercial intercourse with Africa opens an inexhaustible source of 
wealth,” he insists. “The bowels and surface of Africa, abound in valuable and 
useful returns; the hidden treasures of centuries will be brought to light and into 
circulation. . . . The manufacturing interest and the general interests are syn-
onimous. The abolition of slavery would in reality be a universal good” (234). 
The problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that it comes perilously 
close to reinforcing the postulates of colonialist exploitation. Caught up in the 
emancipatory potential of liberalism, Equiano overlooks the possibility that the 
preoccupations of private businessmen and the rights of the individual might not 
be compatible.
 In fact, Equiano’s predicament here echoes that of his intellectual anteced-
ent Adam Smith. As numerous critics have suggested, the central antinomies of 
Smith’s economic philosophy oppose civic responsibility and private enterprise.62 
And these antinomies themselves result from Smith’s apparent assumption that 
all acts of good citizenship must be bracketed as purely subjective. “It is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest,” he famously writes in The Wealth 
of Nations. “We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”63 The 
very rigor with which this maxim is applied, however, generates a paradox when 
Smith poses the question of how the well-being of the public can be advanced. 
At times, it seems that the answer to this question is obvious. Each individual, 
Smith subsequently argues, must exchange what they own or produce with 
other people in order to further themselves. Yet Smith also recognizes that the 
relationship between the private sphere and the public sphere remains paradoxi-
cal because this individual is still concerned merely with personal profit. The 
result of this limitation is that the anomalies of self-interest can only be resolved 
unconsciously. Since human beings are ostensibly indifferent to the needs of 
others, any collective progress must occur without their recognition. In a clear 
echo of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith observes that “every individual 
necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. 
But he generally . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows 
how much he is promoting it; he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
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part of his intention.”64
 Importantly, Olaudah Equiano would seem to agree. Describing his time in 
the Caribbean, for example, Equiano frequently emphasizes how his owner’s 
desire to make money unwittingly led to advantages for an industrious slave. “I 
had the good fortune to please my master in every department in which he em-
ployed me; and there was scarcely any part of his business . . . in which I was not 
occasionally engaged,” he notes. “I became very useful to my master, and saved 
him, as he used to acknowledge, above a hundred pounds a year” (103). Indeed, 
Robert King is so impressed with Equiano’s economic prowess that he gives the 
slave a small amount of capital with which to trade for him. And it is through 
the independence which this task gives him that Equiano begins to accumulate 
the funds for his manumission. But while this act of private acquisitiveness on 
King’s part instigates Equiano’s process of freeing himself it also suggests a 
significant similarity between the self-interest experienced by Equiano and that 
theorized by Smith. For Equiano’s escape from servitude is ultimately dependent 
on King publicly renouncing the personal wealth he could gain from his human 
property. In this respect, just as Smith’s economic philosophy borrows from the 
unconscious ethical mechanisms of benevolence, so the human behavior depicted 
by Equiano is not simply organized around possessive individualism, but also 
reflects moral imperatives drawn from the tradition of sympathetic liberalism.
 In fact, any apparent distinction between Equiano’s and Smith’s presentation 
of self-interest is largely the result of a difference between two understandings 
of the late-eighteenth-century labor market. For although an awareness of racial 
inequality operates throughout the Interesting Narrative, a similar awareness 
figures in The Wealth of Nations at only two points. The first of these moments 
occurs about halfway through the book, and appears as part of Smith’s analysis 
of declining productivity in the British colonies. “The experience of all ages and 
nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears 
to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any,” he writes. “A 
person who can acquire no property, can have no interest but to . . . labour as lit-
tle as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to . . . his own 
maintenance can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any inter-
est of his own” (I:488). For Smith, the detrimental effects of black subjugation 
thus illustrate his conviction that freedom for each individual guarantees greater 
prosperity for the society as a whole. The grounding of an abolitionist argument in 
the self-interest of slave-holders may seem less than ideal, of course, but Smith’s 
intent here is not to critique racial oppression on an humanitarian basis. Instead, 
he suggests that the ideological exigencies of the modern economy dictate that 
one person’s private concerns should not be allowed to infringe upon those of 
another. Smith’s economic philosophy, in this instance, manages to be both liberal 
and enlightened. Because of the reciprocatory nature of commerce, its cognitive 
structures help to militate against any institutionalization of social inequality. 
Thus although the liberal public sphere could, in David Theo Goldberg’s words, 
play “a foundational part in . . . normalizing and naturalizing racial dynamics 
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and racist exclusions,” the reverse is also true.65 Liberalism’s resistance to the 
delimitation of the marketplace could equally enable counter-oppressive claims 
to citizenship by those black subjects who were able to enter into trade.
 Smith’s second discussion of slavery, however, is both more complicated and 
more revealing. Faced again with a widening gap between possessive individual-
ism and the public good, he bridges that gap through reference to an alternative 
tradition of political thinking. “In every country where the unfortunate law of 
slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in 
some measure in the management of the private property of the master” (II:168), 
Smith reminds the reader. Consequently, he continues, “the condition of a slave 
is better under an arbitrary than under a free government. . . . In the Roman 
history . . . we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the 
violence of his master” (II:169). Smith in this passage thus invokes the canon of 
civic humanism to which his own laissez-faire political philosophy is generally 
opposed.66 Subordinating the sanctity of the private sphere to the necessity of 
political interference, this canon insisted that it was the citizen’s duty to seek 
out and disclose social inequalities. As J. G. A. Pocock has pointed out: “In the 
Aristotelian or Machiavellian tradition . . . corruption, which threatened the civic 
bases of personality, was irremediable except by personal virtue itself.”67 The 
fact that Smith draws on this doctrine suggests the extent to which notions of 
positive liberty not only dominated early Enlightenment thought, but also lurked 
within those political discourses which were coming to prominence at the end 
of the eighteenth century. Importantly, both of Smith’s references to slavery 
point toward the ethical constraints of modern liberalism, yet neither reference 
pursues the ideological demands of self-interest to the point of sanctioning black 
subjugation. Hence while someone like St. George Tucker could use “the author 
of the Treatise on the Wealth of Nations” to support his argument that “our own 
security . . . might be endangered by the hasty adoption of any measure for the 
immediate relief of . . . this unhappy race,” Smith’s book itself ultimately advances 
a paradigm of the public sphere which remains progressive.68 Its examination of 
slavery is grounded not only in a circuitous model of liberalism but also in the 
reformist impulses central to eighteenth-century republicanism.
  By pointing out the limitations of liberalism I do not intend to posit re-
publicanism as ideologically immaculate—as free from all the blind spots and 
inconsistencies which plague its counterpart. As David Brion Davis has quite 
rightly pointed out:
In theory, a republic was the most desirable of all forms of 
government, since the proper end of a republic could only be 
the welfare of the people. On the other hand, history had shown 
that republics were exceptionally fragile, particularly when 
a people fell short of the highest standards of public virtue.
. . . As a reform movement, antislavery probed and helped to 
define the boundaries of . . . republican ideology. It embodied 
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some of the central tensions of eighteenth-century thought, and 
also revealed the limits of change which a given society could 
envision or assimilate.69 
Just as liberal ideals such as free labor and the sanctity of contract could be 
underwritten by racial exclusion, so could republican ideals of reason and 
virtue similarly feed into the construction of a normative white supremacy. 
Indeed, one of the most common arguments against black emancipation in the 
Revolutionary period was that slaves lacked reason and so would endanger the 
stability of the republic if set free. The Philadelphian anti-abolitionist Richard 
Nisbet, for example, responded to Benjamin Rush’s Address on the Slavery of 
the Negroes (1773) by effectively inverting the terms of its polemic. Because 
Africans “are utterly unacquainted with the arts, letters, and everything which 
constitutes civilized life,” they could not be turned into virtuous citizens. Nisbet 
insisted that
on the whole, it seems probable, that they are a much inferior 
race of men to the whites, in every respect. We have no 
other method of judging, but by considering their genius and 
government in their native country. Africa, except the small 
part of it inhabited by those of our own colour, is totally over-
run with barbarism.70
Burdened with long-held presumptions about their intellectual prowess, black 
slaves could not easily gain access to the civic life of the West, particularly 
given the paternalistic disdain for dependence central to the classical republican 
tradition. The Enlightenment model of republicanism may well have served 
as a growing source for libertarian thought during the eighteenth century, but 
it had not prevented the growth of bondage in the thirteen colonies nor had 
it impeded English merchants from developing the most sophisticated slave-
trading system in the world.71 Thus when Nisbet followed up his attack on the 
corrupt nature of Africans by asserting that “what I have said, with regard to 
their general character, I dare say most people acquainted with them will agree 
to,” he was not simply being hyperbolic (Nisbet, 23).
 Certainly, slaves themselves were intensely aware of the cultural prejudices 
which acted as constraints upon their participation in civil institutions. Olaudah 
Equiano, for example, explicitly acknowledges the double-edged quality of 
republican values during a passage in which he recalls seeing a free mulatto 
kidnapped in Bermuda. Denied a political voice because of the child-like irra-
tionality ascribed to Africans, this unfortunate individual has no constitutional 
method of challenging his fate. “Hitherto I had thought only slavery dreadful,” 
Equiano comments,
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but the state of a free negro appeared to me now equally so 
at least, and in some respects even worse, for they live in 
constant alarm for their liberty, which is but nominal, for they 
are universally insulted and plundered without the possibility 
of redress; for such is the equity of West Indian laws, that no 
free negro’s evidence will be admitted in their legislature. In 
this situation, is it surprising that slaves, when mildly treated, 
should prefer even the misery of slavery to such a mockery 
of freedom? (122)
No longer subordinate to the will of others, yet unable to exercise any independ-
ent authority, emancipated blacks are thus caught in a kind of social purgatory. 
Refined and delimited by numerous tendentious parties, the notion of disinterested 
virtue seems to lie with its face set against them. It is hardly astonishing then, 
that many African American thinkers turned from civic humanism to sympathetic 
liberalism in order to make the case for abolition. Equiano himself, for instance, 
appears to pursue this strategy when, a few chapters later, he describes seeing 
another kidnapped black being “tied up and kept hanging by the wrists at some 
distance from the ground, [with] half hundred weights . . . fixed to his ankles, in 
which posture he was flogged most unmercifully” (171). Closely echoing that 
moment in The Theory of Moral Sentiments when Adam Smith uses the image of 
us encountering our “brother . . . upon the rack” to illustrate how “we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments” (12), this scene in the Interesting 
Narrative offers a morally compelling alternative to the potential equivocations 
of republican discourse. Rather than relying upon the reader to grant Africans 
the intellectual ability of citizens, the chapter prompts recognition of the fellow 
humanity the reader shares with slaves.
 Before we end up conferring ideological privilege on sentimental liberal-
ism, however, we should also add a note of caution. The benevolent model of 
antislavery literature had its own conceptual limitations, as we can discern from 
another passage in the Interesting Narrative where Equiano himself is the subject 
of our empathetic gaze. Taking place just a few pages after the kidnapping inci-
dent in Bermuda, this passage finds our narrator recollecting how he suffered an 
unprovoked assault from two white men in Georgia. “They beat and mangled me 
in a shameful manner, leaving me nearly dead,” he writes. “I lost so much blood 
from the wounds I received, that I lay quite motionless, and was so benumbed that 
I could not feel anything for many hours” (129). Noting that his master “could 
not forbear weeping” (129) when he saw him in such a state, Equiano clearly 
intends to prompt the same emotions in his reader. Yet this lachrymose pity is 
the very source of sympathetic liberalism’s weakness. Although it encourages 
us to identify with the victims of injustice, it also serves to aggrandize their 
victimhood. Pinned down as an object of ethical indignation through his passive 
suffering, Equiano is essentially rendered impotent in personal terms. One of 
the crucial differences between liberalism and republicanism, in other words, is 
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that the latter incorporates a critical self-reflexivity which enjoins it to actively 
interrogate and combat the corruption of political freedom. Civic humanism 
may supply ideological fuel for the maintenance of racism, but it can also supply 
African Americans with a powerful means for directly challenging that racism. 
Thus Equiano strikes a more effective note earlier in the book perhaps, when 
he substantiates black intelligence and angrily demands of slave-owners, “Why 
do you use . . . instruments of torture? Are they fit to be applied by one rational 
being to another?” (112). Playing off of each other’s imperfections, sympathy 
and virtue form a complex and reciprocal web of arguments.
 Adam Smith, in this respect, is not alone in his emphasis upon benevolence 
and self-interest, nor in his concomitant recognition of the need for a politically 
active citizenry. For a similar conjunction between liberalism and republican-
ism also pervades the writings of the antislavery exponents who followed in his 
wake. In The Effects of Slavery on Morals and Industry (1793), for example, 
Noah Webster notes that,
the only steady, permanent and uniform spring of men’s 
actions, is a regard to their supposed interest. . . . But men, 
instructed by their avarice in a species of subtle casuistry, have 
learnt to make a material distinction between abstract rights 
and private interest. . . . It is therefore highly necessary that 
public measures and private societies should lend their aid to 
accelerate the progress of freedom, and with all convenient 
speed, banish the galling chains of bondage from the shores 
of our Republic.72
Similarly, the ideological ambivalences of the post-revolutionary period also 
helped to shape the world-view of the first generation of black writers. Looking 
to tap into contemporary concerns with their own, more personal, version of 
the antislavery argument they, too, were compelled to make use of an uneasy 
combination of civic principles and free-market dogma. Lemuel Haynes thus 
argues in The Nature and Importance of True Republicanism (1801) that while 
the Constitution guarantees African Americans “certain natural, inherent and 
unalienable rights, amongst which [is] . . . acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property,” the continuing failure of white society to accept this idea requires the 
retention of a more robust conception of citizenship. “We are not to conclude that 
the fair tree of liberty hath reached its highest zenith. . . . A true republican is one 
who wishes well to the good constitution and laws of the commonwealth, [and] is 
ready to lend his heart, his sword and his property for their support.”73 Ultimately 
emphasising a conviction that “virtue and philanthropy will be considered as the 
true criterion of distinction” (Haynes, 81), Haynes’s analysis in this respect echoes 
other attempts to apply the rhetoric of the Revolution to the condition of African 
Americans. The advantage of Haynes’s treatise, however, is that it also explicitly 
acknowledges the discursive discontinuities and convergences that characterized 
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the political beliefs of the period.74 For while republicanism and liberalism have 
long been interpreted as historically distinct phases of Enlightenment thought, 
they are perhaps better understood as mutually constitutive tendencies within a 
single ideological agenda. If nothing else the latter hypothesis certainly seems 
to elucidate that peculiar vacillation between the paradigms of literature and 
commerce which animates early slave narratives.
 Returning to the Interesting Narrative of Olaudah Equiano, for example, 
we can see how its liberal convictions frequently intersect with tenets familiar 
from the republican tradition. Perhaps what is most striking is Equiano’s in-
clination to imbue certain aspects of his political vocabulary with a reciprocal 
double meaning. On one hand, he argues that the major obstacle preventing 
black access to the public sphere is the inequity of the legal system. Discussing 
his own attempts to trade victuals in the Caribbean, he quotes with approval a 
black acquaintance who complains that: “Sometimes when a white man take 
away my fish, I go to my master and he get me my right; but when my master, 
by strength, take away my fishes, what must me do? I can’t go to anybody to be 
righted” (110). Seen from this perspective, slavery is reprehensible because it 
transgresses an archetype of human liberty which is grounded in the possession 
of property. Yet in the very next paragraph, Equiano also critiques racial oppres-
sion from a republican standpoint. “The slave-trade . . . violates that first right 
of mankind, equality and independency.” He continues, “When you make men 
slaves, you deprive them of half their virtue. . . . You stupify them with stripes, 
and think it necessary to keep them in a state of ignorance; and yet you assert 
that they are incapable of learning” (111). Seen from this perspective, slavery is 
unjust because it hypocritically precludes African Americans from gaining those 
skills that would enable them to participate in political debate. (In fact, Equiano, 
using the words of Milton, goes on to argue that the “stripes and arbitrary punish-
ment” inflicted on “us enslav’d” [112] gives blacks the right to rebel against the 
constituted authorities in order to claim citizenship.) Bracketing this model of 
human freedom with the previous one that Equiano deployed, we can then see 
that his conception of the black man’s “rights” is, in effect, multivalent. When 
confronted with the acute menace of racial inequality, the civic and the economic 
seem to operate as complementary resources of libertarian discourse.
 Indeed, much of the Interesting Narrative is concerned with elaborating 
an alliance between these two lines of reasoning. But as Equiano’s association 
of political participation with the “first right” of mankind might suggest the 
rhetorical relationship between the civic and the economic is not necessarily 
symmetrical. Instead, Equiano most frequently invokes notions of political cor-
ruption as a means of counteracting the problems posed by black involvement 
in the marketplace. “I have sometimes heard it asserted, that a negro cannot earn 
his master the first cost; but nothing can be farther from the truth,” he claims at 
one point. “I suppose nine tenths of the mechanics throughout the West Indies 
are negro slaves; I well know the coopers among them earn two dollars a day . . . 
and I have known many slaves whose masters would not take a thousand pounds 
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current for them” (103). While intended to substantiate Equiano’s portrait of black 
diligence, however, this passage also risks undermining his broader assertion 
that it is in the self-interest of slave-holders to renounce their human property. 
Consequently, Equiano must then go on to reinforce his argument for abolition 
through reference to a different set of ideological assumptions. “I was often a 
witness to cruelties of every kind, which were exercised on my unhappy fellow 
slaves,” (104) he adds quickly, before presenting us with a lengthy catalogue 
of white rapists, murderers, and thieves. Having inadvertently complicated his 
economic postulates, Equiano thus turns in their place to a disclosure of the 
private immoralities and political injustices occasioned by slavery. As elsewhere 
in the Interesting Narrative, the critical power of literature essentially serves to 
supplement the autonomizing logic of commerce.
 It is this reliance on the redemptive qualities of publicity, for example, that 
structures the climactic moment in Equiano’s struggle for freedom—the scene of 
his manumission. The manumission comes about, as I have already suggested, 
both through Equiano’s economic skill and through the benevolence of his master. 
Having successfully accumulated a small personal fortune as a result of his trad-
ing, he manages to persuade Robert King to grant him his liberty in exchange for 
forty pounds sterling. The trouble with this transaction, however, is that it inher-
ently accedes to the encoding of black bodies as transferable pieces of property. 
The perverse material logic of racism, in other words, ensures that Equiano’s 
emancipation is not so much dependent on his natural right to participate in the 
marketplace as it is on King’s willingness to sell his interest in the slave. Accord-
ingly, Equiano then resorts once more to the disseminatory potential of print in 
order to cover the breach in his world-view. “As the form of my manumission 
has something peculiar in it, and expresses the absolute power and dominion 
one man claims over his fellow, I shall beg leave to present it before my readers 
at full length” (137). Implicitly undermining the arbitrary authority of the white 
race, Equiano’s ability to reinscribe this legal document within the pages of his 
autobiography enables him to reassert his own discursive autonomy. Through 
the independent command of his text, rather than through the exchange values 
of commerce, Equiano finally regains control over the utility of his body.
 Like other black abolitionists writing in the late eighteenth century, Equiano 
thus seems to privilege the principle of civic participation over that of personal 
enterprise. Ignatius Sancho declares in his Letters of an African (1782), “I have 
heard it more than once observed of fortunate adventurers—they have come home 
enriched in purse—but wretchedly barren in intellects.” He continues, “I would 
not give thee Money—nor Territory . . . I would give thee Books. Books are fair 
Virtue’s advocates and friends!”75 And similarly, in Thoughts and Sentiments on 
the Evil of Slavery (1787), Ottobah Cuguoano notes that: “A few may get their 
liberty, by their own industry and ingenuity . . . [in] mechanical trades, or useful 
business. . . . I have both obtained liberty, and acquired the great advantages of 
some little learning, in being able to read and write.”76 What is more, like these 
other ex-slaves, Equiano turns to a print-orientated paradigm of self-emancipation 
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as a result of the structural constraints which dog the trade-orientated model of 
freedom.77 The problem with economic liberalism, in this respect, is that its ubiq-
uitous emphasis on the accumulation of property is irreparably double edged. For 
as Saidiya V. Hartman has pointed out, while the concept of free enterprise may 
theoretically offer antebellum blacks empowerment and security, it also serves 
to defuse a communal recognition of and response to racial exploitation:
Liberalism, in general, and rights discourse, in particular, 
assure entitlements and privileges [even] as they enable and 
efface elemental forms of domination, primarily because of the 
atomistic portrayal of social relations, the inability to address 
collective interests and needs, and the sanctioning of subor-
dination and the free reign of prejudice in the construction of 
the social or private.78
 Nowhere are the difficulties involved in the equalization of race relations 
more obvious than in Equiano’s argument for the commercialization of African 
society at the end of his book. Reflecting the progressive impulses of modern 
liberalism, such arguments promised to initiate the weak and the oppressed into 
the advantages of possessive individualism. Yet they also helped to obscure the 
new and more subtle forms of inequality and exploitation which followed the 
spread of capitalism. In the same year that the Interesting Narrative was pub-
lished, for example, the leading British abolitionist William Wilberforce proposed 
the establishment of a trade agreement with a group of free blacks who would 
be relocated to Sierra Leone. “Though justice be the principle of the measure, 
yet, I trust, I shall distinctly prove it to be reconcileable with our truest political 
interest,” he argued.
An extensive commerce with Africa in . . . commodities might 
probably be substituted in place of that which is now carried 
on in Slaves, so as at least to afford a return for the same 
quantity of goods as has annually been carried thither. . . . And 
such a commerce might reasonably be expected to increase 
in proportion to the progress of civilization and improvement 
on that continent.79
 While Wilberforce’s rhetoric here holds out the hope of liberty, the restrictive 
“apprenticeships” and “indentures” that were eventually imposed on the settlers 
in Sierra Leone tell a different story. As the radical reformer Thomas Perronet 
Thompson remarked after taking up the colony’s governorship in 1808: “The 
effect has evidently been by an affected prohibition of slavery in general, to ac-
knowledge and legislate the practice as far as it was convenient. It is as if a law 
for preventing assassinations should have approved a sanctuary for murder.”80
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 Tellingly then, we can see once again how the language of the marketplace 
serves to elide the persistence of racial oppression. This crucial flaw does not, of 
course, mean that liberalism is simply willfully deceptive—that it is a political 
dummy easily available for any act of exploitative ventriloquism. Instead, like 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” William Wilberforce’s figure of a correlation 
between financial profit and African freedom indicates the benevolent effects of 
self-interest. Wilberforce’s aim, in other words, is to employ the emancipatory 
rather than the repressive potential of the economic discourses which were emerg-
ing in the late eighteenth century. Without dismissing the egalitarian potential of 
early modern liberalism then, my point is that its ideological edicts inadvertently 
(and almost inevitably) contradict themselves. And in doing so, these edicts 
necessitate recourse to ostensibly antagonistic principles drawn from the repub-
lican tradition. To borrow the words of Jürgen Habermas: “Control over private 
property could not without further circumstances be transposed into the freedom 
of autonomous human beings. . . . [So] the representation of the interests of the 
privatized domain of a market economy was interpreted with the aid of ideas . 
. . functionally adapted to the institutions of the public sphere in the world of 
letters.”81 Ultimately then, those tensions between literature and commerce that 
transect early black writing seem to enact this paradox. Seeking social equality, 
African Americans in the eighteenth century traced their conception of liberty 
to a liberal ideology which, by grounding identity in the possession of goods, 
unintentionally perpetuated the ontological mechanisms of slavery. But they also 
deployed a republican model of civic participation, and those literary institutions 
which underpinned it, as a means of resistance to that perpetuation.
 That much being said, however, we should perhaps conclude by acknowl-
edging the limited life-span of this particular model of citizenship. Whatever 
explanatory power civic humanism may have possessed during the Revolutionary 
era, it became increasingly unwieldy during the early nineteenth century. This 
does not mean that it simply evaporated under the pressure of industrial enter-
prise and Jacksonian individualism. As Joyce Appleby has noted, “While most 
scholars would agree that the possibility of institutionalizing the civic values 
extolled in classical republicanism ended with the ratification of the Constitution, 
the vitality of republican ideals not only persisted but continued to embarrass the 
progress of liberal values in America.”82 What we do need to concede, though, 
is that with the ascendance of bourgeois democracy these ideals often persisted 
in a strangely altered form. Seeking to understand the rapidly blossoming new 
society around them, the generation that followed the Founding Fathers effec-
tively dismantled the republican tradition, preserving what was still relevant and 
fusing other elements with liberal values. Even in the 1790s, for example, the 
notion of “virtue” was already being stripped of its grounding in disinterest and 
its emphasis on social responsibility was being connected to a privatized (and 
heavily gendered) model of moral chastity.83 Thus when we look to the political 
language used by abolitionists in the antebellum period we must be aware both 
of what has changed and what remains the same. Harriet Jacobs’s attack on “the 
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all-pervading corruption produced by slavery” has, in this respect, more to do 
with its violation of physical integrity than with its oppression of rational capa-
bilities, while William Wells Brown’s argument that “anti-slavery literature . . . 
is a voice from the prison house, unfolding the deeds of darkness which are there 
perpetrated” still retains an emphasis on the political utility of print alongside a 
sentimental insistence that “heart mingles with heart, in this great work of the 
slave’s deliverance.”84 The ongoing challenge for students of African-American 
culture then, is not only to recover the impact of classical republicanism on the 
first generation of black thinkers, but also to understand the complex legacy of 
the Revolutionary period in the works that followed.
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